(A report on the Encompass Programme 2009 Conference Medan, Sumatra, January 6-8, 2009)
In the history of twentieth-century Southeast Asia, the state has been an omnipresent actor, while at the same time remaining an elusive concept. The Encompass programme engages in developing a more profound understanding of the significance of the state and its transformations in Indonesia and Asia during the era of decolonization. During a preparatory conference in Jakarta, January 2008, the character of the late-colonial state and its successors, the Japanese military administration and the Indonesian republic, has been discussed. The supposition of a fundamental continuity of state institutions through different stages of regime change was debated at length. The concept of ‘the state’—and the central state in particular—as a paramount political actor, a mover of people, and a source of authority, was fundamentally challenged.
The aim of the 2009 Medan conference was to discuss the nature and trajectory of the changes that occurred during the mid-twentieth century transition from colonial rule to independence. In the research agenda for the conference, several key issues for discussion were defined. A call was made for a) a stronger conceptualization of the (late-colonial and post-colonial) state, and its connection to existing or imagined political communities; b) a multi-level approach, separating perceptions of a centralized and hegemonic empire and state from supposedly self-evident connections to ‘the nation’; and c) studying the theories and practices of state-building in times of transition. In accordance with the larger Encompass project, the study of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia was chosen as a point of departure. The wider environment of South and Southeast Asia, however, remains an indispensable window for transnational and comparative study of the main topics. The general purpose was to develop more subtle analyses of the (tortuous and problematic) transition from the late-colonial state to independence.
At the conference, presentations and debates converged around the following issues and concepts:
1. The Late-Colonial State
The nature of the late-colonial state and its influence on its successor states was widely discussed at the conference. The late-colonial state was identified as a particular stage in the history of European empires, characterized by knowledge gathering as a strategy for gaining domination; ‘closing the map’ of the colonial territory; establishing power structures for the actual domination of the colony, and working towards homogeneous administrative and legal arrangements. Eric Tagliacozzo (Cornell University, Ithaca) provocatively pinpointed the internal contradictions of the process of state formation in the Netherlands East Indies. Arguing against an image of ever-increasing colonial power, he suggested that in fact the heyday of colonial power in the colony was the years immediately before the First World War. At the time, the vitality and potential of the colonial regime were most clearly manifested. A process of guided modernization supported the rulers’ optimistic sense of mission. In their eyes, ‘just and effective rule’ was a purpose in itself, and a measure of success. At the same time, Tagliacozzo held that such vitality and efficacy could not hide the fact that the very developments that established and sustained the colonial state were also working towards the downfall of the project.
The expansion of the late-colonial state was unmistakable. In many ways, the state apparatus was strengthened and new ties between state and society were established. One example was given by Annelieke Dirks (Leiden University), whose analysis of the operation of colonial juvenile courts indicates that the re-education of young delinquents was a project in which both colonial administrators and Indonesians engaged in. Another area in which paternalism and repression rubbed shoulders was in the realm of colonial policing. Marieke Bloembergen (University of Amsterdam) dealt with the creation of a ‘modern’ colonial police force in the early twentieth century. Refashioned to represent the colonial state at village level, the new policeman mirrored the contradictory sides of the colonial agenda, as an instrument of both coercion and care.
Despite the new appearances and aims of the colonial state, it would be a mistake to think of ‘the state’ primarily in the way in which states tend to advertise themselves: strong, hegemonic and paternalistic. In contrast, several papers at the conference suggested that colonial state formation was an uneven process, which worked in different and sometimes contrary directions. In his presentation, “The Rise of the State in Indonesia?” Remco Raben (Utrecht University) challenged the assumption of a hegemonic, centralized late-colonial state by contending that the late-colonial state was often understaffed, weakly organized and only partially interested in the society over which it ruled. The imperfections of the late-colonial state were also evident in the legal domain. Robert Cribb (Australian National University, Canberra) pointed out the fundamental and continuous phenomenon of legal exemptions in both the colonial and postcolonial societies. From a modernist point of view, this did much to poison relations between the state and the powerful in society.
Several other speakers demonstrated the modus operandi of the colonial state by analysing the fields of taxation (Abdul Wahid, Leiden University), health care (Li Wen, Leiden University) and labour relations (Dewi Yuliati, Diponegoro University, Semarang). Their cases demonstrated the necessity of increasing interference by the colonial state and its concomitant claims of progress, while also highlighting its limitations. Tax centralization was slow, health care provisions for coolie workers often fell short of its pretensions, and reactions to railway-workers’ strikes were often bluntly repressive. In a similar vein, Monique Erkelens (Leiden University) pointed out the failure of the colonial state to abolish the Chinese Officers’ system in Batavia and to bring the Chinese community under an unmediated colonial administration. And Dirk Buiskool (Omlandia, Medan), dealing with the activities of the Medan town council, discussed the extremely limited constituency and late development of urban institutions. Until the end of Dutch rule, the administrative pattern of the Netherlands Indies remained hybrid, and attempts at rationalization and centralization were often flawed.
2. Authority and Legitimacy
In his keynote lecture, Robert Elson (University of Queensland, Brisbane) addressed, among other things, the strengths and weaknesses of the Dutch colonial state in the face of the Japanese military offensive in Asia. The central question was how the seemingly powerful structure could actually be killed off in just a few days. The explanations he brought forward related as much to the very reasons for its endurance as to its inherent weaknesses. As concerns the latter, Elson mentioned the fact that the Netherlands Indies as a project did not possess a clear vision, other than to be there and make it economically viable. Therefore, administrators saw control and domination as more essential than the redefinition of the territory as a political body. As a territory, the Indies lacked coherence but could exist as a site of convenience in international power relations. The colonizers did not convey a strong sense of purpose, or ownership, to the colonized, and thus neglected to create legitimacy for their rule. Nevertheless, there were reasons for the Netherlands Indies to endure as a European colony until 1941: the sheer size and broad scope of the territory as a whole, ruled by a fairly efficient bureaucracy, able to control and steer; and the colonial government’s image of modernity which appealed to indigenous elites.
The struggle for state legitimacy during political transition has several strands. In the first place, in a Weberian sense, the legitimacy of rulers and their institutions is connected to authority. Authority is an underlying feeling among the ruled that the rulers are rightfully in their position, even if the ruled do not completely agree to all the elements of their politics. Rulers need authority to make their state run without putting an armed guard behind every citizen or subject. In times of political transition, however, legitimacy has to be conquered in the first place by assuming and controlling state power. But such takeover requires support, which can be gained by both an appeal to common values and by good performance.
The Dutch regime supported its claim for legitimacy on the legality of colonial rule, from the point of view of traditional international law, within the context of the nineteenth and early twentieth-century world system. Justification was further derived from a sense of empire that included the concepts of racial superiority, a civilizing mission, and integration into a world market. The late-colonial state was essentially an administration employed to make the status quo more perfect. Under the circumstances and limitations of colonial relations and the world economic slump, the regime’s performance was relatively good. At the same time, the self-assuredness of colonial rulers in this respect seemed to blind them to the value-oriented ambitions of the national and religious currents among the population. Even in the full process of post-war transitions and decolonization, empire justified by performance determined the mindset of Dutch policy making.
The Japanese military rulers made performance a central part of their policy, but it was essentially tied to the interest of their own military effort in Asia. Their policy toward the Indonesian population as a whole, however, was linked to the justification of their position as new rulers in the colony and their leadership in finishing Western domination in Asia. Japanese politics concerning the future of Indonesia was, at least in part, opportunistic, but nevertheless it worked to facilitate and direct mass political mobilization. The end of Japanese rule and the improvised, multi-facetted transitions to new political realities that followed the Japanese capitulation created the need to invent and proclaim a clear purpose, based on common values; but it also required performance, especially in the sphere of fighting humanitarian crises, restoring the rule of law and establishing fair and impartial ‘good’ government.
Postcolonial rulers also struggled with issues of legitimacy. For them, functional legitimation, based on whether the state could satisfy the basic needs of the people, was just as important as ideological legitimation. As Remco Raben argued, bureaucratic performance was an essential ingredient of legitimation, as it had an enormous influence over how the government was perceived and its authority accepted. It may well be, he argued, that a contrasting narrative of the strong colonial state that lacked political legitimacy, and an independent Indonesia that failed to build a state, is not a very fruitful way to approach the issue of governance and legitimation in the era of decolonization. However, an emphasis on the effectiveness and impact of bureaucratic performance might break open the impasse between the contrasting notions of the state as a power-wielder and the nation as the substance of political identification.
Contributing to the legitimation of the colonial status quo was the promise and allure of modernity, which in the end it was self-defeating, as the independent state was perceived primarily in terms of political modernity. In several papers, the issue was raised of whether the (late-)colonial state should actually be considered a fully developed state. It may just as well be argued that it embodied a set of institutions engaged in a limited catalogue of administrative and economic activities. Thus, its legitimate claim to authority was necessarily fragmented. The state established and maintained the monopoly of violence in order to secure control over the bulk of the population. It constructed material and institutional infrastructures, but related to the ambitions of only a small part of the population; it did not facilitate an indigenous civil society, nor did it recognize indigenous political ambitions. Nevertheless, the late-colonial state managed to acquire an aura of modernity. As was shown in the papers on education, health-care and the administration of justice, institutions can be carriers of modernity. Thus, in the colonial context, state performance operated as an instrument of acquiring legitimacy for the regime, but only by default. The colonial administration grew increasingly more effective and its modern image attracted support from the rising middle classes of Eurasian and Indonesian background.
Consequently, the debate about modernity entered the conference’s deliberations. As Henk Schulte Nordholt (KITLV Leiden) argued, in the 1930s large numbers of aspiring young people opted to be part of the process. The rising Indonesian middle class, and educated people in particular, projected their ambitions and expectations towards the (colonial) public authorities. By so doing, they probably modelled their self-images after ideas of Western modernity, which offered to many a more appealing prospect than the choice to turn to the nationalist movement (although the two did not necessarily contradict each other).
All consecutive regimes—Dutch, Japanese and various Indonesian—embraced their own image of modernity: the developmental state of the Dutch, the Asian alternative found in the modernity of the Japanese, and the more ambiguous but nevertheless ambitious modernizing programmes of the Indonesian Republic. Several speakers indicated that, however elusive the concept of modernity remains, in the late-colonial state an increasing number of the indigenous elites started to question custom and tradition, to think about their place in history, and to orient themselves to a common future. Thus, they took essentially modern positions and prepared themselves for the contestation of established authority.
4. The Politics of Belonging
During the twentieth century, state-formation gave the issue of belonging to political communities new topicality. Empires—especially colonial empires—were not accustomed to the inclusion of individual subjects as citizens. Their field of reference was primarily territories which had to be appropriated and ruled. Thus, in relation to the indigenous populations, the colonial states were in large part empty sockets: intended to control and administer subjects, but not to foster citizenship. Some of the indigenous elites accepted the idea of empire by projecting their ambitions and cultural tastes towards the metropole as a ‘Motherland’ which provided guidance and education. Others related primarily to existing regional, religious or ethnic identities and tried to conceive of new perspectives within the colonial context. Empire was discredited on a global scale during the twentieth century, both as an idea and as a practice, and since the early twentieth century new senses of belonging and political identification emerged out of the framework of colonial state formation and colonial education. It is important to note that the historiography of these developments has long been dominated by national perspectives of the outcome.
Biographical and prosopographical approaches offered wonderful insights into the fundamental plurality of ideas of citizenship, loyalty and nationhood. Farabi Fakih (Leiden University) tracked the ideological evolution of the pioneer of Indonesian nationalism, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo. In line with Eric Tagliacozzo, he argued that some of the new ideas resulted from the colonial knowledge-gathering projects, as in Tjipto’s case on the Hindu past of Java, which established an idea of Indonesia as a potential nation. On the other hand, he demonstrated that the traffic of ideas and education made an international political discourse—Marxism in particular—accessible to Indonesians and enabled them to conceptualize their thoughts outside colonial contexts. Tjipto’s case demonstrates the merging of international notions of social justice with notions from a perceived indigenous tradition.
A promising approach to the history of transition is to look at the lives of less prominent people. While protagonists seem to be marked or shaped much more clearly by the discontinuities of history, many others followed more variable and sometimes ambiguous trajectories. One example of this was given in the paper by Marije Plomp (Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, Amsterdam) on the colonial civil servant and Republican leader Pieter de Queljoe. At first sight, he appears to be an archetypical survivor in a succession of three waves of regime change. Still, his story indicates that under the circumstances, survival was not a matter of staying aloof when things became heated and than carefully adapting to new conditions; on the contrary, De Queljoe’s experience under the Dutch and Japanese made him an activist turncoat, and he presented himself to the new authorities as a man with independent means and independent appeal, thus protecting himself from a fall from grace.
Concentrating on a different class of people, Agus Suwignyo (Universitas Gajah Mada, Yogyakarta) presented a case study on the role played by Indonesian teacher trainees in Indonesian nation-building, especially during the Japanese rule. In the colonial period, teachers could expect to become pillars of the educational system of the colonial order. Thus, the schools were mainly an instrument, in Henk Schulte Nordholt’s terms, to participate in colonial modernity and to achieve upward social mobility. The Japanese conquest, however, changed all of this. The students now had to reorient their outlook on society as well as on their profession. In an ideological shift, they proved themselves to be a new intellectual elite, a vanguard of the nation, who originated from the common people and had a strong impact on revolutionary and post-revolutionary Indonesian society.
In her analysis of the following Indonesian and Malaysian authors—Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Soedjatmoko, Syed Hussein Alatas and Usman Awang—Rachel Leow (Cambridge University) pointed to common concerns among postcolonial intellectuals. Each in their own fashion developed ideas about the task of intellectuals in their new countries and their commitment to improving society. They inherited the concerns of their intellectual predecessors about the tensions between local culture (and language) and the alluring and threatening influence of the West. For them, the struggle for autonomy was as fundamental as it had been to the nationalists in colonial times.
Robert Elson suggested that Indonesia during the 1930s to 1950s could be characterized as ‘a state being in search for a nation’. The late-colonial state was conceived and consolidated as a unitary state, but due to its colonial character it abstained from bolstering collective identities relating to the population at large. The Japanese rulers hoped to serve their own interests by stressing a common Asian identity and interests, and only in the final stages of their presence did they promote the idea of an Indonesian national movement of independence. After Japan’s surrender, the new Indonesian state formation was a difficult process; one of its features was the difficulty of the leadership to define the links between the newly defined political community and nationhood. Would the latter be founded on political ideals such as democracy and human rights, on religion, or on statehood and territory as such? These issues had to be solved in the midst of far-reaching political upheaval and confusion, in which the legitimacy of rulers was fragmented, and the contradictory phenomena of regionalism, particularism and extremism were omnipresent. Under these circumstances, it was left to the state to construct a nation.
During the conference, the triangular relationship between nation, state and society was discussed once again. Issues of ethnicity, social interest, and political ambition did not automatically work towards the establishment of a unitary state supported by a homogeneous sense of belonging. During the process of state formation, emotional meaning and a sense of purpose were constructed and uploaded in order to establish the legitimacy of institutions, while existing notions of community were challenged and actually broken down. Several competing ideas of state and statehood occurred at the same time, both on the regional level and at the centre.
Chiara Formichi (School of Oriental and African Studies, London) addressed one challenge to the dominance of the Republic of Indonesia and its ruling concepts by the Darul Islam (DI), the competing Islamic state established during the war of independence in West-Java. She challenged the established view that DI was essentially a religiously motivated rebellion against moderate tendencies within the Republic. Formichi argued that the DI leadership originally founded the parallel state to step into a power vacuum left by the Republic as a result of the negotiating process with the Dutch, and in the early days of the war did not intend to put forward a substitute for, or an opposite against, the Republic. The DI relied on traditional networks of religious leaders. Only in the final stages of the war, and throughout the 1950s, did the Darul Islam assume a violently dissenting position.
Challenges to the ‘pseudo-nativist’ Indonesian state (Robert Elson) were manifold, and several were reviewed during the conference. As TSAI Yen-ling (National University of Singapore) demonstrated for the case of the Chinese, the position of the Indonesian and foreign Chinese was a continuing source of concern and conflict for the Chinese communities. She argued that the marginalization of the Chinese during the 1950s and 1960s was the outcome of the nation-building process and the concomitant disruption of trans-border social geographies of, in her case, the North-Sumatran Chinese.
The Indonesian struggle to build both a state and a nation, and the reactions that this effort engendered, dominated politics in the decades after independence and caused many of the tribulations of post-independence Indonesia. The search for political, social and religious identities was not confined to the state or to politics proper. One last clash occurred in 1965-1966, with the murderous campaigns of the army and its helpers against the PKI and its supposed sympathizers. According to Budi Agustono and Junita Setiana Ginting (Universitas Sumatera Utara, Medan), the killings of 1965 caused a mass conversion to Christianity among the people of Karo land in northern Sumatra who wanted to avoid stigmatization as communists, a majority of whom had been followers of local pelbegu beliefs. This is an example of how the search for state identity affected local communities.
It would seem that in Indonesia, more than in most other Asian countries, the Pacific War and the revolution constituted a rupture in the administrative traditions of the state. To what extent this is true remains to be seen. Remco Raben argued that there is amazingly little knowledge about the traditions and legacies of colonial and postcolonial bureaucratic and democratic practices. Indeed, parts of the infrastructure and bureaucracy were inherited from the preceding colonial rule, as were democratic ideals (but not its practice). The improvised military administrations and political planning of the Japanese occupation had created new ways of political mobilization and rearranged the monopoly of violence through the creation of (semi-)armed bodies of volunteers. In the process of actual regime change provoked by war or revolution, old structures quickly lose relevance. As state genealogies were broken, the development of successor states was often a matter of trial and error.
Each phase in the period of transition established its own patterns and traditions that left their marks on postcolonial Indonesian society. For instance, Robert Elson pointed at the legacies of what he called the ‘Japanese military state’. Its main characteristic was a sense of purpose, which was much stronger than that of its Dutch colonial predecessor. The power of the state was first and foremost a capacity to be employed for the mobilization of all forces and means for the occupier’s warfare. Such a one-dimensional approach was responsible for large degrees of inefficiency, and actual waste of capacity. The most important legacy, on the other hand, was the consolidation of ‘the idea of Indonesia’, even under the fragmented military administration of the Japanese. The Japanese authorities were prepared to create opportunities for the mobilisation of political ambition by Indonesians. Thus, they paved the way for the founding of their own state.
Interestingly, both late-colonial and early-independent governments made attempts to bolster their legitimacy by developing democratic structures. Earlier colonial democracy was extremely ethnocentric and franchises were extremely limited. After the Pacific War, democratic procedures were introduced in the territories reoccupied by the Dutch and in the Republic, but arrangements were often half-hearted. One very late example was presented by Bernarda Meteray (Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta), who explained how the institution of the New Guinea Council was postponed. She demonstrated how the Council, although it had a weak record, fostered perceptions of self-determination among Papuas.
Indonesian democracy had not a single lineage, and the inspiration for representative government had various sources. In revolutionary Java, local councils were ‘spontaneously’ instituted before they were absorbed by the Republic (or killed off by the Dutch). Sometimes influences on postcolonial Indonesia reached over the heads of the colonial rulers to early or pre-colonial times. This was illustrated by Bambang Purwanto (Universitas Gajah Mada, Yogyakarta), who reminded the conference of Mohammad Hatta’s views, expressed in the 1950s, of Indonesian village democracy as an example of an indigenous tradition that had become obsolete but could serve as a source of inspiration.
An issue hardly addressed during the conference was the fundamental disruption of life as a result of war and social and political upheaval. Establishing and maintaining the monopoly of violence was a prime purpose of the colonial army and police. Foreign invasion, and the subsequent revolutionary warfare, caused the end of colonial authority and its monopoly of violence. Thus, violence on a large scale was both a phenomenon of discontinuity and a potential cause for it. Warfare removed rulers at the central level and undermined the local and regional administrators. Warfare caused growing economic hardship, massive replacements of people, humanitarian crises and internment of the former colonizers.
War and occupation worked towards oppression and mobilization at the same time—mobilization in economic and social respects, but always geared towards the military purposes of the Dutch, and later on towards the Japanese rulers. The latter addressed larger parts of the Indonesian population and thus created a fighting spirit. The independence movement was able to turn this towards an offensive weapon aimed at the deployment of revolutionary violence. The British intermezzo of 1945-1946 and the Dutch effort to regain the colony gave rise to extreme measures of violence and counter-violence, to terror and counter-terror. The Republic was not averse to the use of violence to safeguard its position when contested by armed uprisings and autonomous action from within its territorial claim, as well as those outside of its political scope.
There were continuities of many different kinds. Thomas Lindblad (Leiden University) discussed the persisting power of Dutch big businesses in Indonesia. Analysing the interplay of the developing world economy and economic decolonization, he argued that Indonesia did not profit much from the nationalization of Dutch business in 1957, as Indonesia became dependent on other European trade partners. Another example of the ongoing rearrangement of colonial configurations concerned the laws on territorial waters, as discussed by Singgih Tri Sulistiyono (Universitas Diponegoro, Semarang). He showed that the laws were adjusted to the perceptions and political aims of the Indonesian government in their struggle over Irian.
7. Transnational dimensions
Decolonizations are often described in national terms, but their international dimensions and ramifications are great. Not only do decolonizations follow regional patterns, they occur within a framework of heightened mobility and perceptiveness of outside influences. On the other hand, the mid-twentieth-century transition also brought about deep changes in the patterns of exchange between countries. This was highlighted by Tim Harper (Magdalene College, Cambridge), who argued that the end of empire caused a fundamental change of focus and geography. Multi-ethnic empires gave way to nativist or ethnocentric nation-states. Borders assumed different functions, and state practices concerning the mobility of people changed.
Viewpoints from the perspective of connectivity between new states were put forward by Sunil Amrith, Carolien Stolte and Jean-Louis Margolin. Sunil Amrith (Birkbeck College, London) presented a historical survey of economical and political connections between India and Southeast Asia, stretching from migrant labour in the early twentieth centrury, via the development of nation-constructing historical narratives in the 1920s and 1930s, to the development and sharing of postcolonial national self-consciousness. Carolien Stolte (Leiden University) analysed how the concept of India moved away from the European model towards an India that was more specifically defined in its Asian surroundings and its own cultural and historical development. The process of consolidation of both its domestic legitimacy and international position worked towards stressing its ‘Asian self’. Stolte argued that the conceptualization of India’s Asian relations was not the prerogative of the central state, but was done and contested by several civil organizations. Jean-Louis Margolin (Université de Provence, Aix-Marseille) discussed the political platform of the Singapore independence movement in search for a concept of rule and development for the new nation. The leadership was strongly influenced by revisionist and technocratic socialism in the British tradition. At the same time they sought inspiration from the political examples of Third World nation-builders such as Soekarno, Nasser and Mao Zedong. In the early 1960s, however, they turned again to other models for ideas on planning for a social welfare state.
Several lines of enquiry emerged from the discussions at the conference. First of all, the character of the successive states deserve closer scrutiny. Many participants discussed specific actions of the state; its presence was taken for granted. At several moments during the different political transitions, however, the state appeared to be absent, or its authority and legitimacy fundamentally contested. Despite the state’s claim to sovereignty, its hegemonic capacities were often flawed. There seems to have been an underlying continuity stretching from the late-colonial state (repressive, exploitative and pragmatic; adapting to circumstances where required in order to remain in possession of authority) via the Japanese military regime (local by orientation, harsh by nature) to the revolutionary state and the short-lived neo-colonial emergency state. Whatever their differences, all successive states struggled with problems of performance and legitimacy, and all these states borrowed and inherited practices from each other. The administrative genealogies are dazzlingly complex, but would be worthwhile to study.
Secondly, the triangular relationship of state, society and nation deserves close attention. Although jointly pulsating to political and social developments, their interplay is extremely dynamic in this period of transition, being indicative of the versatile relationship between the rulers and the ruled, and the elements determining the outcomes of the struggle for authority and search for legitimacy. This also points to the notion that the developments and outcomes can be seen as path-dependent.
Thirdly, the research agenda would include an enquiry into individual and group agency as motors of political and social change. In order to avoid finalistic and nation-centred assumptions, biographical and prosopographical approaches can make a major contribution to the history of the twentieth-century transition. The strategies, options and changing outlook of the specific individuals or groups can illustrate the open-ended nature of the phase of transition.
Lastly, international and transnational linkages and comparisons are essential to an understanding of the Indonesian experience. To a great extent, colonial and postcolonial societies were open to influences from abroad: not only can colonialism be considered a vector of international influences and mobility, but the twentieth century saw the rise to prominence of universalist ideologies, transnational religious affinities and cross-border influences. As decolonization is primarily viewed as a process of nationalization, the international dimensions (apart from international diplomacy) are often neglected.
Peter Romijn and Remco Raben
Makalah-makalah telah dipresentasikan dalam Konfrensi Internasional ENCOMPASS di Unimed 6-8 Januari 2009
Erond L. Damanik, M.Si
Pusat Studi Sejarah dan Ilmu-ilmu Sosial
Lembaga Penelitian Universitas Negeri Medan
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